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A QUESTION OF ‘DESIRABILITY’: BALANCING AND IMPROPERLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Andrew L-T Choo* 
 
Debates about improperly obtained evidence continue to arise in common law appellate courts 
on a surprisingly regular basis. In 2015, the Irish Supreme Court handed down a decision on 
the topic which ran to over 155,000 words.1 Among the major common law jurisdictions 
outside the United States, Australia can be regarded as something of a pioneer in its approach 
to the admissibility of illegally or otherwise improperly obtained evidence. In 1978 the High 
Court of Australia in Bunning v Cross,2 building on its earlier decision in R v Ireland,3 
established the existence of a discretion to exclude such evidence that was distinct from the 
discretion to exclude evidence to ensure fairness to a defendant at trial. Section 138 of the 
UEL,4 the focus of this chapter, was closely modelled on this common law jurisprudence. At 
the time of Bunning, the law in England and Wales was characterised by little judicial analysis 
of the issue of improperly obtained evidence,5 and Canada was still some years away from 
introducing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with its well-known provision on 
evidence obtained in consequence of Charter violations.6 
 In the light of major continuing developments in the common law world in this area of 
evidence law, this chapter seeks to provide a searching and timely analysis of selected aspects 
of section 138, as viewed from the perspective of an evidence scholar working in England and 
Wales, with the aim of asking what lessons may be learnt from a contemporary comparison of 
section 138 with the approaches taken to improperly obtained evidence in other common law 
jurisdictions. The chief focus will be on the particular species of evidence that can be 
considered to highlight most clearly the relevant theoretical and practical issues raised by 
improperly obtained evidence—evidence that was not brought into fruition by any interaction 
between a member, or agent, of the executive and a suspect. In other words, the improprieties 
that will be the primary concern of this chapter are those that do not contribute in some way to 
                                                          
* My thanks are due to Dr Kelly Pitcher, Assistant Professor, Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Leiden 
University, for illuminating discussions of a variety of issues relevant to this chapter. 
1 The estimate is Daly’s: YM Daly, ‘Overruling the Protectionist Exclusionary Rule: DPP v JC’ (2015) 19 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 270 at 276. 
2 (1978) 141 CLR 54. 
3 (1970) 126 CLR 321. 
4 In this chapter, all references will be to the Commonwealth version. 
5 See eg R v Sang [1980] AC 402, decided by the House of Lords in 1979, a year after Bunning v Cross. 
6 Section 24(2). 
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the generation of the evidence in question; the situations are such that there is no suspicion that 
evidence of doubtful reliability or veracity has been produced by the impropriety. So, for 
example, within the primary scope of the chapter will be evidence obtained as a result of an 
illegal search, or evidence obtained by improper means of ‘spontaneous’ conversations that 
were not in some way induced by the conduct of the executive. Outside the primary scope of 
the chapter will be evidence obtained improperly during formal police interrogations, or 
‘informal’ interrogations involving the covert questioning of a suspect by a police agent. 
 
1. The ‘Trigger’ 
The basis for consideration of section 138 is ‘[e]vidence that was obtained (a) improperly or in 
contravention of an Australian law, or (b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a 
contravention of an Australian law’. French CJ observed in Parker v Comptroller-General of 
Customs that, while ‘[t]here is no definition of “impropriety” or “contravention” in the Act’,7 
‘[m]ere failure to satisfy a condition necessary for the exercise of a statutory power is not a 
contravention. Nor would such a failure readily be characterised as “impropriety” although that 
word does cover a wider range of conduct than the word “contravention”’.8 This clearly signals 
a desire to confine the interpretations to be given to two crucial words that might otherwise be 
susceptible of interpretations considered to be unacceptably wide. In a similar vein, Basten JA 
suggested in Robinson v Woolworths Ltd that ‘impropriety’ connotes something more than a 
minor departure from the minimum acceptable standards of law enforcement.9 One feature of 
note for the overseas observer is the absence of any overt constitutional dimension to 
considerations of the topic of improperly obtained evidence in Australia. This is in contrast to 
the position in the United States, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Ireland and, even, 
England and Wales, in all of which jurisdictions considerations of improperly obtained 
evidence typically take place against the background of particular human rights instruments. 
In the United States, as is well known, the prohibition of illegal searches and seizures by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has precipitated the judicially created 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, pursuant to which evidence obtained as a result of 
Fourth Amendment violations is presumptively inadmissible.10 The Evidence Act 2006 of New 
                                                          
7 [2009] HCA 7 at [26]. 
8 Ibid at [30]. 
9 [2005] NSWCCA 426 at [23]. 
10 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984). The scope of the rule is increasingly subject to exceptions: see recently the 
application of the ‘attenuation’ exception in Utah v Strieff 136 S Ct 2056 (2016); noted in ‘Fourth Amendment— 
Exclusionary Rule—Deterrence Costs and Benefits—Utah v Strieff’ (2016) 130 Harvard Law Review 337. 
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Zealand makes specific provision in relation to improperly obtained evidence, which is defined 
as including evidence obtained ‘in consequence of a breach of any enactment or rule of law by 
a person to whom section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies’;11 section 24(2) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms makes specific provision in relation to 
evidence ‘obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by 
this Charter’; and section 35(5) of the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution makes 
specific provision in relation to evidence ‘obtained in a manner that violates any right in the 
Bill of Rights’. 
 In England and Wales, the ‘consitutionalisation’ of considerations of improperly 
obtained evidence has arisen more indirectly, through the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
This legislation, never uncontroversial and now under particular attack,12 makes certain key 
rights of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) directly enforceable in the 
domestic law of England and Wales. Further, the 1998 Act obliges domestic judges to ‘take 
into account’ relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.13 Judicial 
discussions of improperly obtained evidence of the type that forms the focus of this chapter 
tend now to take place against the background of considerations of two articles of the ECHR 
that are directly enforceable in domestic law by virtue of the 1998 Act. The first of these, article 
3, provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. The other, article 8, states: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
 
 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
 Notably absent in England and Wales—in contrast with the position in New Zealand, 
Canada or South Africa—is any specific provision dealing with the admissibility of evidence 
                                                          
11 Section 30(5)(a). 
12 See, for a recent account, C Gearty, On Fantasy Island: Britain, Strasbourg, and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford, 
2016). 
13 Section 2(1)(a). 
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obtained in violation of such articles of the ECHR.14 Admissibility, as will be seen below, is a 
matter that is left to courts to determine by reference to any other applicable legal principles. 
 
2. Burdens of Proof 
It seems clear that, under the section 138 régime, the burden of proving the relevant impropriety 
lies on the defence: ‘The party seeking to exclude the evidence has the burden of showing that 
the conditions for its exclusion are satisfied, namely that it was obtained improperly or in 
contravention of an Australian law’.15 New Zealand, by contrast, takes the arguably preferable 
approach of making it sufficient that the defendant ‘raises, on the basis of an evidential 
foundation, the issue of whether … evidence was improperly obtained and informs the 
prosecution of the grounds for raising the issue’.16 
 The burden of proving the impropriety having been discharged, the prosecution then 
bears the burden of proving that the primary ‘test’ in section 138(1) is satisfied—that is, that 
‘the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence 
that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained’. A balancing test 
requiring a determination of overall ‘desirability’ is not, of course, unique to section 138(1), 
featuring also in sections 18 and 126B. The High Court has clarified that the discharge of the 
prosecution’s burden in respect of the section 138(1) test involves ‘a two stage process. The 
party seeking admission of the evidence has the burden of proof of facts relevant to matters 
weighing in favour of admission. It also has the burden of persuading the court that the 
desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence 
obtained in the way in which it was obtained’.17 
 
3. The Implications of Placing the Burden of Justifying Admission on the 
Prosecution 
The main difference between section 138 and the Australian common law position concerns 
the placement of the burden on the prosecution by section 138. In proposing this, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission appeared optimistic that reversing the common law position on this 
                                                          
14 Ireland, likewise, has no specific provision dealing with the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence, but, as seen elsewhere in this chapter, the Irish Supreme Court has engaged remarkably thoroughly with 
the topic. The same cannot be said of the appellate courts of England and Wales. 
15 Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs [2009] HCA 7 at [28]. 
16 Evidence Act 2006 s 30(1)(a). 
17 Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs [2009] HCA 7 at [28] (italics added). 
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point would produce an increased incidence of exclusion,18 but the extent to which the 
Commission’s expectations of more exclusion have been realised may be questionable. Outside 
Canada, where there have been notable attempts to generate empirical data concerning the 
operation of section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in practice,19 few 
studies have been conducted in comparable jurisdictions of the extent of exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence. One of these was Presser’s study of the early years of the 
operation of section 138, when only the Commonwealth and New South Wales legislation had 
been introduced. This research revealed uncertainty about whether the provision had actually 
achieved its purpose of increasing the incidence of exclusion.20 To gain a general impression 
of the courts’ approach to section 138, I examined those criminal cases decided, from 2000 
onwards, in the appeal courts of UEL jurisdictions which appeared to contain some tangible 
discussion of the provision in the context of allegedly illegal searches or the allegedly improper 
covert recording of conversations, and found as follows: 
• 23 such cases were identified.21 
• In 15 of the 23 cases it was held that there was no illegality or impropriety.22 Presser’s 
finding of ‘judicial reluctance in uniform evidence jurisdictions to classify police 
conduct as illegal in order to avoid having to work backwards from a starting point of 
inadmissibility’23 may still hold very true a decade and a half later. 
• In four of the 23 cases it was held that admission was justified despite the illegality or 
impropriety.24 
                                                          
18 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 (Interim) Vol 1 (Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1985), para 964. 
19 See eg R Jochelson, D Huang and M J Murchison, ‘Empiricizing Exclusionary Remedies—A Cross Canada 
Study of Exclusion of Evidence under s 24(2) of the Charter, Five Years after Grant’ (2016) 63 Criminal Law 
Quarterly 206. 
20 B Presser, ‘Public Policy, Police Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to Exclude Improperly or 
Illegally Obtained Evidence’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 757. 
21 R v Haddad [2000] NSWCCA 351; R v Moussa [2001] NSWCCA 427; R v Rondo [2001] NSWCCA 540; R v 
Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6; R v Phan [2003] NSWCCA 205; R v McKeough [2003] NSWCCA 385; R v Le 
[2005] NSWCCA 40; O’Meara v R [2006] NSWCCA 131; R v Camilleri [2007] NSWCCA 36; Fleming v R 
[2009] NSWCCA 233; Cornwell v R [2010] NSWCCA 59; DPP v Marijancevic [2011] VSCA 355; Hills v R 
[2011] VSCA 364; ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266; R v Sibraa [2012] NSWCCA 19; GA v R [2012] VSCA 44; 
Davies v R [2014] VSCA 284; R v Gallagher [2015] NSWCCA 228; Keenan v R [2015] ACTCA 52; Heyward v 
Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58; Yabsley v R [2015] TASCCA 25; Watkins v DPP [2015] VSCA 363; Yazdani v R 
[2016] NSWCCA 194. 
22 R v Haddad [2000] NSWCCA 351; R v Moussa [2001] NSWCCA 427; R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6; R v 
McKeough [2003] NSWCCA 385; R v Le [2005] NSWCCA 40; O’Meara v R [2006] NSWCCA 131; Fleming v 
R [2009] NSWCCA 233; Cornwell v R [2010] NSWCCA 59; Hills v R [2011] VSCA 364; GA v R [2012] VSCA 
44; Davies v R [2014] VSCA 284; Keenan v R [2015] ACTCA 52; Heyward v Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58; Yabsley 
v R [2015] TASCCA 25; Watkins v DPP [2015] VSCA 363. 
23 Above n 20 at 784. 
24 R v Phan [2003] NSWCCA 205; R v Camilleri [2007] NSWCCA 36; ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266; R v 
Gallagher [2015] NSWCCA 228. 
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• In only two of the 23 cases was it held that exclusion was justified.25 It is notable that 
in one of these it was emphasised that there had been multiple illegalities,26 and in the 
other that the decision turned on the particular facts.27 
• In one case there was held to be a relevant illegality but the majority declined to express 
a view on the section 138 issue.28 
• In the remaining case it was felt unnecessary to form a view on whether there was any 
illegality or impropriety.29 
 It is interesting to note that, although there is no consensus on the issue, the view has 
been expressed on occasion in England and Wales that, while they may be appropriate in the 
context of making a factual determination that is to form the basis of applying any test for the 
admissibility of evidence, the concepts of burden and standard of proof are inappropriate in the 
context of the evaluative element of the test. For example, in R (Saifi) v Governor of Brixton 
Prison,30 the Administrative Court noted in relation to the ‘fairness’ discretion encapsulated in 
section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984:31 
 
 The power [conferred by section 78(1)] is to be exercised whenever an issue appears as to whether the 
court could conclude that the evidence should not be admitted. The concept of a burden of proof has no 
part to play in such circumstances. No doubt it is for that reason that there is no express provision as to 
the burden of proof, and we see no basis for implying such a burden. The prosecution desiring to adduce 
and the defence seeking to exclude evidence will each seek to persuade the court about impact on fairness. 
We regard the position as neutral and see no reason why section 78 should be understood as requiring 
the court to consider upon whom the burden of proof rests.32 
 
 Acceptance of this pragmatic view might reinforce any suspicion that the formal 
placement of the burden on the prosecution by section 138 is of greater significance 
symbolically than practically. This is not, however, to downplay such symbolic significance, 
for, as Ho puts it: ‘If … the criminal trial is conceived in terms of holding the executive to the 
rule of law, otherwise admissible evidence ought to be treated as (prima facie) inadmissible 
                                                          
25 R v Rondo [2001] NSWCCA 540; DPP v Marijancevic [2011] VSCA 355. 
26 R v Rondo [2001] NSWCCA 540 at [137]. 
27 DPP v Marijancevic [2011] VSCA 355 at [92]. 
28 R v Sibraa [2012] NSWCCA 19. 
29 Yazdani v R [2016] NSWCCA 194. 
30 [2001] 1 WLR 1134. 
31 The s 78(1) discretion is considered in greater detail below. 
32 [2001] 1 WLR 1134 at [52]. 
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once it is shown that the executive had obtained it by unlawful means. If the Prosecution insists 
on using the evidence, it should bear the onus of justifying its admission’.33 
 
4. The Role of the Discretion to Exclude Evidence to Ensure ‘Fairness to the 
Defendant’ 
It is clear that the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of section 138 are considered to be 
distinct from those of—for example—section 90. This idea has firm origins in the Australian 
common law, as evident at least since Bunning v Cross. In that case, the High Court considered 
the general discretion to exclude prosecution evidence to ensure fairness to the defendant at 
trial—assumed by the Privy Council in Kuruma v R34 to be the only exclusionary discretion 
potentially available in the context of improperly obtained evidence—to be inappropriate in 
the case of 
 
what might loosely be called ‘real evidence’, such as articles found by search, recordings of 
conversations, the result of breathalyzer tests, fingerprint evidence and so on. … ‘Fair’ or ‘unfair’ is 
largely meaningless when considering fingerprint evidence obtained by force or a trick or even the 
evidence of possession of, say, explosives or weapons obtained by an unlawful search of body or 
baggage, aided by electronic scanners.35 
 
Likewise, ‘[i]f a “breathalyzer” test, properly performed and with all attendant safeguards 
observed, discloses an excessive level of alcohol in a motorist’s blood it is in no sense “unfair” 
to use it in the conviction of the motorist’.36 The unsuitability of the ‘unfairness to the 
defendant’ discretion in such contexts required, the Court thought, the recognition of an 
additional specific discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence. 
 This approach of recognising a discretion that stands alongside, but is distinct from, a 
discretion aimed solely at ensuring trial fairness is consistent with that taken in other major 
common law jurisdictions outside the United States. For example, section 35(5) of the Bill of 
Rights of the South African Constitution very clearly states: ‘Evidence obtained in a manner 
that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence 
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice’. The 
approach in England and Wales, however, remains radically different, with the judicial 
                                                          
33 HL Ho, ‘The Criminal Trial, the Rule of Law and the Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence’ (2016) 10 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 109 at 129. 
34 [1955] AC 197. 
35 (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 75. 
36 Ibid at 77. 
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discretion to exclude evidence to ensure trial fairness—in either its common law or statutory 
guise—apparently remaining the only basis in domestic law for excluding improperly obtained 
evidence. The common law discretion has, for some three decades, been largely superseded by 
section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which provides: 
 
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to 
be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances 
in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.37 
 
The implications of the reasoning of the High Court of Australia in Bunning v Cross with 
respect to the notion of ‘fairness’, examined above, would be that the operation of section 78(1) 
would be confined to situations where executive misconduct has led to the generation of 
evidence that may be of doubtful veracity (hence it might be unfair to the defendant to admit 
the evidence); it would be inapplicable, for example, to evidence obtained in an illegal search. 
It is, of course, for this reason that the High Court felt that an additional discretion was 
necessary. Yet the Court acknowledged in Bunning itself that it would be possible, 
alternatively, to take a view of unfairness to the defendant that was so wide that the need for 
the additional discretion would effectively be obviated. Indeed, it noted that in a case 
subsequent to Kuruma the Privy Council itself had done precisely this: 
 
 In King v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 304 their Lordships do indeed, while applying Kuruma … so enlarge 
the matters to be considered under the rubric of unfairness to the accused, a concept which they observe 
to be ‘not susceptible of close definition’, that it closely approaches what was said in [R v Ireland] … 
Their Lordships agreed with Lord MacDermott CJ who had said, in Reg v Murphy [1965] NILR 138, at 
p 149, that unfairness to the accused was to be judged ‘in the light of all the material facts and findings 
and all the surrounding circumstances. The position of the accused, the nature of the investigation, and 
the gravity or otherwise of the suspected offence, may all be relevant’. Their Lordships concluded by a 
phrase which perhaps savours more of the Ireland approach than that of Kuruma: they spoke of ‘conduct 
of which the Crown ought not to take advantage’.38 
 
 It is this passage in Bunning which perhaps best explains the contemporary approach 
of England and Wales to improperly obtained evidence. While that jurisdiction has clung 
steadfastly to the idea that the ‘trial fairness’ discretion remains the sole vehicle for achieving 
                                                          
37 Italics added. 
38 (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 76. 
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the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence, what constitutes a ‘fair trial’ is considered a 
matter for the trial judge, and thus there is—arguably—implicit acceptance that the discretion 
may be interpreted widely if the trial judge sees fit. Indeed, (admittedly dated) empirical 
evidence39 reveals virtually no consensus among trial judges on precisely what the section 
78(1) discretion entails, with the exercise of the discretion typically being approached on the 
basis that it would be patently obvious whether exclusion is justified in a given case. The 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, rather than enhancing protection, may, if anything, 
have reinforced the idea that the ‘fair trial’ criterion affords sufficient protection. European 
Court of Human Rights jurisprudence considers the issue of improperly obtained evidence by 
reference to whether a breach of a particular Convention article—typically article 3 or article 
8—in the obtaining of the evidence would lead, if the evidence were to be admitted, to a breach 
of article 6(1), which guarantees the right to a fair trial. This jurisprudence has established40—
and allowed the domestic courts of England and Wales, in ‘taking into account’ that 
jurisprudence, to proclaim contentedly41—that section 78(1) and article 6(1) work together in 
harmony: conscientious judicial consideration of the section 78(1) discretion would ensure that 
article 6(1) is adequately protected. 
 
5. Theoretical Basis or Bases for Exclusion 
In contrast with, for example, evidence of a confession obtained improperly from a suspect by 
the police, improperly obtained evidence of the type being considered in this chapter does not 
raise any concern that the relevant impropriety has led to the generation of evidence that may 
not prove the defendant’s guilt or innocence accurately. It is therefore non-epistemic rather 
than epistemic considerations that must be relied on to justify any exclusion of such evidence. 
A non-epistemic consideration is premised not on the promotion of accurate fact-finding or 
truth discovery (or, in Benthamite parlance, ‘rectitude of decision’42), but rather on the 
promotion of any value or values unrelated to the achievement of accurate fact-finding.43 Its 
                                                          
39 M Hunter, ‘Judicial Discretion: Section 78 in Practice’ [1994] Criminal Law Review 558 at 562–3. 
40 Khan v UK, App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000). Cf Prade v Germany, App no 7215/10 (ECtHR, 3 March 
2016); Bašić v Croatia, App no 22251/13 (ECtHR, 25 October 2016). 
41 R v P [2001] 2 WLR 463 at 475; R v Loveridge [2001] EWCA Crim 973 at [33]; R v Mason [2002] EWCA 
Crim 385 at [67]; R v Hardy [2002] EWCA Crim 3012 at [18]. 
42 J Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice, Vol 1 (Hunt & Clarke, 
London, 1827) (reprinted Garland Publishing, New York, 1978), p 1. 
43 Of course, the exclusion of evidence of a confession may be justified not only by reference to epistemic 
considerations, but also to non-epistemic ones. See, in relation to evidence of coerced confessions, JJ Tomkovicz, 
Constitutional Exclusion: The Rules, Rights, and Remedies That Strike the Balance between Freedom and Order 
(OUP, New York, 2011), p 83. 
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focus being on deontological concerns with intrinsic values that are unrelated to the promotion 
of accurate fact-finding, such a consideration ‘represents a political-moral judgment that 
certain values are more important than accuracy in fact-finding. As such, it limits the truth that 
is allowed to appear at trial in favor of social goals which transcend the importance of factual 
truth’.44 To exclude improperly obtained evidence of the type under consideration in this 
chapter is to exclude it not because of any danger of unreliability which may have been ‘caused’ 
by the executive impropriety, but because to admit it may undermine other values that are 
deemed worthy of protection. Given that the entire notion that non-epistemic considerations 
may be said to justify particular principles of evidence and procedure is not necessarily 
uncontroversial,45 an attempt at identifying such values with some precision is necessary. 
 What, then, might such values be? The basic test of section 138 is notably vague on this 
point, failing to spell out what might lie behind the ‘undesirability’ of admitting improperly 
obtained evidence. However, the Australian Law Reform Commission, on whose 
recommendations section 138 was based, had contemplated that a most comprehensive range 
of considerations might be relevant. These include the ‘usual suspects’:46 
• disciplining and deterring the police, and encouraging the use of proper methods of 
police investigation (while acknowledging the existence of principled and practical 
objections to the use of exclusion as a tool of discipline or deterrence, the Commission 
felt that ‘[i]t would be surprising … if the exclusion of evidence did not make the 
particular officer more careful in future in his conduct’, or ‘if exclusion of evidence did 
not have some general deterrent effect’); 
• vindication of the defendant’s rights (if it is appropriate that ‘a suspect whose rights 
have been infringed should not thereby be placed at any disadvantage [and] should be 
placed in the same position he would have been in if the misconduct had not occurred’, 
                                                          
44 RP Burns, A Theory of the Trial (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999), p 95. See also DJ Galligan, 
‘More Scepticism about Scepticism’ (1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 249 at 255; TJ Reed, ‘Evidentiary 
Failures: A Structural Theory of Evidence Applied to Hearsay Issues’ (1994) 18 American Journal of Trial 
Advocacy 353 at 362. 
45 See eg WT Pizzi, Trials without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials Has Become an Expensive Failure 
and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It (New York University Press, New York, 1999); A Stein, Foundations of 
Evidence Law (OUP, Oxford, 2005); L Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology 
(CUP, Cambridge, 2006). 
46 Above n 18, para 959. See also P Chau, ‘Excluding Integrity? Revisiting Non-Consequentialist Justifications 
for Excluding Improperly Obtained Evidence in Criminal Trials’ in J Hunter, P Roberts, SNM Young and D Dixon 
(eds), The Integrity of Criminal Process: From Theory into Practice (Hart, Oxford, 2016). 
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then ‘[t]o achieve this objective evidence obtained improperly should be excluded’);47 
and 
• maintaining executive and judicial legitimacy (here, the tenor of the Commission’s 
discussion suggests a focus on ‘public attitude integrity’ (which is premised on the idea 
of maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system48 through the avoidance 
of the courts, as bodies that are meant to uphold the law, being seen to be complicit in 
executive improprieties) rather than on ‘court-centred integrity’ (which is premised on 
the idea that, irrespective of appearances, exclusion should be a moral duty of the court 
as a means of repudiating the impropriety and thus preserving the purity of the judiciary 
and—by extension—of the criminal justice system generally49)). 
 
 Such an approach runs the risk, in attempting to achieve everything, of ultimately 
achieving nothing satisfactorily.50 It is of course well known that the United States Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is premised—not uncontroversially51—on deterrence.52 The 
principled and practical difficulties associated with viewing exclusion as a tool of deterrence 
apply equally to the ‘public attitude integrity’ rationale for exclusion. Made in the context of 
the abuse of process doctrine, the comments of Heydon J, dissenting in Moti v R, are notable 
for their scathing castigation of such a rationale: 
 
 There are various … difficulties with appeals to ‘public confidence’. The expression is tending to become 
an automatic reflex, to be used in almost any context in which an attempt is made to stimulate a vague 
feeling of goodwill, just as restaurant owners cannot answer any question about their restaurants without 
referring to ‘fresh ingredients’. The expression is beginning to lack meaning. It usually postpones or 
evades problems. It does not face them or solve them. At least that is so in this particular field. What does 
‘public confidence’ mean? What does ‘disrepute’ mean? Among which members of the public is 
disrepute, or a rise or fall in confidence, to be searched for or avoided? Might it not be better for courts 
                                                          
47 For searching analysis of this concept see P Roberts, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Constitutional or 
Human Rights?’ in L Zedner and JV Roberts, Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays 
in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (OUP, Oxford, 2012). 
48 For a critique see SNM Young, ‘A Public Law Conception of Integrity in the Criminal Process’ in Hunter et al 
(eds), above n 46, pp 38ff. 
49 For extensive discussion of ‘public attitude integrity’ and ‘court-centred integrity’, and the literature relating 
thereto, see KM Pitcher, Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal 
Proceedings (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2016). 
50 See, however, M Madden, ‘A Model Rule for Excluding Improperly or Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence’ 
(2015) 33 Berkeley Journal of  International Law 442. 
51 See eg K Bilz, ‘Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclusionary Rule’ (2012) 9 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 149. 
52 See especially US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984). 
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not to keep looking over their shoulders by worrying about their reputation or any perceived level of 
confidence in them? Should they not rather simply concentrate on doing their job diligently, carefully, 
honestly and independently, whatever the public or the community think?53 
 
 Far preferable to any approach reliant to any degree on the notion of public attitude 
integrity would be an approach focused on court-centred integrity alone, and which treats any 
positive effects of exclusion on reputation (or on police behaviour) as collateral benefits.54 
Integral to, rather than separate from, the duty of the judiciary to act ‘diligently, carefully, 
honestly and independently’ (to use Heydon J’s words) is its moral duty, as a body charged 
with upholding the law, effectively to repudiate the impropriety, thereby preserving the purity 
of the judiciary and hence of the criminal justice system as a whole. Such dissociation or 
repudiation should be regarded as a good in itself, rather than being motivated by a desire to 
be seen to be good. It is here that the Canadian experience is illuminating. Section 24(2) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that evidence obtained in violation of a 
Charter right ‘shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute’.55 Read literally, this clearly suggests the notion of public attitude integrity, but the 
Supreme Court of Canada has established an interpretation of section 24(2) that effectively 
makes court-centred integrity the basis for exclusion. This was achieved through an objective 
rather than subjective interpretation of ‘disrepute’: ‘The inquiry is objective. It asks whether a 
reasonable person, informed of all relevant circumstances and the values underlying the 
Charter, would conclude that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute’.56 
 
6. Confining Discretion 
The vagaries of the exercise of judicial discretion, even where it is constrained by factors that 
are prescribed for consideration, or guided by factors recommended for consideration, suggest 
that, as far as possible, clearer-cut rules should be formulated for application in particular 
situations. An obvious option is to identify particular forms of impropriety that might be 
thought to justify automatic exclusion. In England and Wales, consideration has been given to 
                                                          
53 [2011] HCA 50 at [101]. 
54 Empirical research has found such an approach to command support: above n 51. See also Note, ‘Rights in 
Flux: Nonconsequentialism, Consequentialism, and the Judicial Role’ (2017) 130 Harvard Law Review 1436. 
55 Italics added. 
56 R v Grant 2009 SCC 32 at [68]. 
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whether automatic exclusion should follow from breaches of article 3 of the ECHR. In A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department57 the House of Lords confirmed the existence of 
an absolute rule prohibiting the admission of any evidence obtained by torture. In the words of 
Lord Carswell: ‘the duty not to countenance the use of torture by admission of evidence so 
obtained in judicial proceedings must be regarded as paramount and … to allow its admission 
would shock the conscience, abuse or degrade the proceedings and involve the state in moral 
defilement’.58 This exclusionary rule was specifically held to be confined to torture, not 
extending to inhuman or degrading treatment, which is also prohibited by article 3. 
Subsequently, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights confirmed in Jalloh 
v Germany that the admission of evidence obtained in breach of the ‘torture’ limb of article 3 
would invariably violate article 6(1): 
 
[I]ncriminating evidence—whether in the form of a confession or real evidence—obtained as a result of 
acts of violence or brutality or other forms of treatment which can be characterised as torture—should 
never be relied on as proof of the victim’s guilt, irrespective of its probative value. Any other conclusion 
would only serve to legitimate indirectly the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of 
Article 3 of the Convention sought to proscribe …59 
 
The Grand Chamber, however, left open the question whether evidence obtained as a result of 
inhuman or degrading treatment, but not torture, was also subject to an automatic exclusionary 
rule.60 
 It is strongly arguable that the operation of the exclusionary rule should not be confined 
to the ‘torture’ limb of article 3; if torture is considered—rightly—to be sufficiently morally 
reprehensible to justify mandatory exclusion, then so too should be inhuman or degrading 
treatment. To draw a bright line between torture on the one hand, and inhuman or degrading 
treatment on the other, would be arbitrary and overlook the fact that article 3 violations will 
only very exceptionally be found: ‘Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is 
to fall within the scope of Article 3’.61 In addition, I have argued elsewhere62 that, in England 
and Wales, mandatory exclusion should follow from the violation of any article of the ECHR 
that has been made directly enforceable in domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Key 
                                                          
57 [2005] UKHL 71. 
58 Ibid at [150]. 
59 App no 54810/00 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 11 July 2006) at [105]. 
60 Ibid at [107]. 
61 Muršić v Croatia, App no 7334/13 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 20 October 2016) at [97]. 
62 See eg AL-T Choo, Evidence (OUP, Oxford, 4th edn, 2015), pp 189–90. 
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among these would be article 8, which, as seen above, essentially concerns the right to privacy. 
It might be objected that the right to privacy is of a different dimension from the right to 
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, and, even if it would be appropriate 
for any breach of the latter right to result in exclusion, this should not be an automatic 
consequence of any breach of the former right. Such an objection misses a crucial point. This 
is that, while the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment guaranteed 
by article 3 is an unqualified right, the right to privacy in article 8 is subject to various 
qualifications; the guarantee of the right in the first paragraph of article 8 is then made subject 
to a list of wide-ranging exceptions in the second paragraph. If one of these exceptions applies, 
there will be no breach of article 8 despite the interference with the right to privacy. In the 
result, therefore, while any violation of the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment would constitute a violation of article 3, only unjustified violations of the 
right to privacy constitute a breach of article 8. A breach of article 8 is therefore, by definition, 
a serious breach, and automatic exclusion for infringing article 8 would not be inconsistent 
with exclusion for infringing article 3. What is not being advocated is that any interference 
with the right to privacy of the defendant that has resulted in evidence being obtained should 
automatically lead to its exclusion.63 
 It must be conceded that the prospects of such a line of argument finding any favour 
with the courts of England and Wales are, at best, slim. In one case the Court of Appeal was 
horrified by the idea of mandatory exclusion of any evidence obtained in breach of article 8: 
 
 The intrusion or interference has already occurred … and so the court’s obligation is confined to deciding 
whether or not, having regard to the way in which the evidence was obtained, it would be fair to admit 
it. ... What [counsel for the appellants] is saying is that the court is bound to exclude any evidence 
obtained in breach of article 8 because otherwise it would be acting unlawfully. This is a startling 
proposition and one which we are pleased and relieved to be able to reject.64 
 
Interestingly, however, the Crown Prosecution Service Statement of Ethical Principles for the 
Public Prosecutor declares that ‘prosecutors must[,] bearing in mind the Courts [sic] discretion 
to exclude improperly obtained evidence, decline to use evidence reasonably believed to have 
                                                          
63 Such a point is made clearly by Judge Loucaides in his dissent in Khan v UK, App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 
May 2000) in the context of explaining that adoption of a rule requiring the mandatory exclusion of evidence 
obtained in breach of article 8 would not lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of all interferences 
with the right to privacy: ‘evidence amounting to an interference with the right to privacy can be admitted in court 
proceedings and can lead to a conviction for a crime, if the securing of such evidence satisfies the requirements 
of the second paragraph of Article 8’. 
64 R v Button [2005] EWCA Crim 516 at [23]–[24]. 
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been obtained through unlawful methods which constitute a grave violation of the suspect’s or 
other person’s human rights, against anyone other than those who applied such methods’.65 To 
what extent illegalities other than torture would be considered to constitute a ‘grave violation’ 
is of course an open question. Further, dissenting judges in the European Court of Human 
Rights have sometimes advocated the mandatory exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of 
any article of the ECHR. In Khan v UK,66 for example, Judge Loucaides was unable to ‘accept 
that a trial can be “fair”, as required by Article 6, if a person’s guilt for any offence is 
established through evidence obtained in breach of the human rights guaranteed by the 
Convention’. He considered that there was ‘an obligation on the United Kingdom courts not to 
admit or rely on evidence in judicial proceedings which was obtained contrary to the 
Convention’. ‘Moreover, if it is accepted that the admission of evidence obtained in breach of 
the Convention against an accused person is not necessarily a breach of the required fairness 
under Article 6, then the effective protection of the rights under the Convention will be 
frustrated’.67 
 
7. Relevant Factors 
The UEL jurisdictions and New Zealand are unique among the major common law jurisdictions 
in having at their disposal lists contained in statutory provisions of factors relevant to the 
exercise of discretion in respect of improperly obtained evidence. The eight factors listed in 
section 138(3) that, in determining whether the primary test in section 138(1) is satisfied, a 
court ‘is to take into account’68 closely mirror the eight listed factors to which a New Zealand 
court ‘may … have regard’,69 in ‘determin[ing] whether or not the exclusion of the evidence is 
proportionate to the impropriety by means of a balancing process that gives appropriate weight 
to the impropriety and takes proper account of the need for an effective and credible system of 
justice’.70 
 In Canada, the latest refinements to the interpretation of section 24(2) were articulated 
in R v Grant, the Supreme Court holding that a court must 
 
                                                          
65 Paragraph 4.5 (italics added); 
<www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/statment_of_ethical_principles_for_the_public_prosecutor/>. 
66 App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000). 
67 The view of Judge Loucaides was endorsed by Judge Tulkens in her dissent on the article 6(1) issue in PG v 
UK, App no 44787/98 (ECtHR, 25 September 2001). 
68 Italics added. 
69 Evidence Act 2006 s 30(3) (italics added). 
70 Evidence Act 2006 s 30(2)(b). I have taken account of amendments to wording in force from 8 January 2017. 
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hav[e] regard to: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct …, (2) the impact of the 
breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused …, and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication 
of the case on its merits. The court’s role on a s 24(2) application is to balance the assessments under 
each of these lines of inquiry … No overarching rule governs how the balance is to be struck. 
Mathematical precision is obviously not possible.71 
 
By contrast, in its 2015 decision, DPP v JC,72 the Irish Supreme Court articulated rather more 
robust guidance as follows: 
 
Where evidence is taken in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights then the evidence 
should be excluded save in … exceptional circumstances … In this context deliberate and conscious 
refers to knowledge of the unconstitutionality of the taking of the relevant evidence … The assessment 
as to whether evidence was taken in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights requires 
an analysis of the conduct or state of mind not only of the individual who actually gathered the evidence 
concerned but also any other senior official or officials within the investigating or enforcement authority 
concerned who is involved either in that decision or in decisions of that type generally or in putting in 
place policies concerning evidence gathering of the type concerned. 
 
 … Where evidence is taken in circumstances of unconstitutionality but where the prosecution establishes 
that same was not conscious and deliberate in the sense previously appearing, then a presumption against 
the admission of the relevant evidence arises. Such evidence should be admitted where the prosecution 
establishes that the evidence was obtained in circumstances where any breach of rights was due to 
inadvertence or derives from subsequent legal developments. 
 
 … Evidence which is obtained or gathered in circumstances where same could not have been 
constitutionally obtained or gathered should not be admitted even if those involved in the relevant 
evidence gathering were unaware due to inadvertence of the absence of authority.73 
 
 Even this approach, however, was considered by the minority of the Court to constitute 
too much of a watering down of previous Irish Supreme Court jurisprudence: one dissenting 
judge, for example, was ‘gravely apprehensive that the majority decision … is a major step in 
the disengagement of this Court from the rights-oriented jurisprudence of our predecessors’,74 
while another thought that ‘operating the new test … can only be done in my view on a case 
by case basis with little room for the establishment of principles at a general level; this for 
                                                          
71 2009 SCC 32 at [71], [86]. For recent application see R v Paterson 2017 SCC 15. 
72 [2015] IESC 31. See Daly, above n 1; C Leon and T Ward, ‘The Irish Exclusionary Rule after DPP v JC’ (2015) 
35 Legal Studies 590. 
73 [2015] IESC 31 per Clarke J at [7.2]. 
74 [2015] IESC 31 per Hardiman J. 
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many concerned in the criminal justice system will be regretted and will make the discharge of 
their respective responsibilities all the more difficult’.75 
 In view of the fact that lists of factors to guide trial judges, provided either in 
legislation76 or in appellate case law,77 are now commonplace in the contemporary78 evidence 
law of England and Wales, it is somewhat puzzling that judicial guidance on how the 
interpretation of section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be 
approached in considering improperly obtained evidence is virtually absent. Within the same 
general context of whether a party bringing an action should be hampered on account of its 
association with some illegality or impropriety, there is to be encountered in England and 
Wales much less of a ‘hands off’ approach in the treatment of other specific issues. Closely 
relatedly, the discretion to stay the proceedings where the entire prosecution, rather than 
particular evidence, can be considered to be ‘tainted’ by impropriety has received extensive 
discussion which seeks to articulate (at least some of) the factors relevant to its exercise. These 
include: the seriousness of any violation of rights (whether the defendant’s or even a third 
party’s); whether the police have acted in bad faith or maliciously, or with an improper motive; 
whether the misconduct was committed in circumstances of urgency, emergency or necessity; 
the availability or otherwise of a direct sanction against the person(s) responsible for the 
misconduct; and the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged.79 Even in 
a doctrinally distinct area of the law, the law of contract, the United Kingdom Supreme Court80 
recently rationalised the implications of illegality in very similar terms: 
 
 The essential rationale of the illegality doctrine is that it would be contrary to the public interest to enforce 
a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system … In assessing whether the public 
interest would be harmed in that way, it is necessary (a) to consider the underlying purpose of the 
prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the 
claim, (b) to consider any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an 
                                                          
75 [2015] IESC 31 per McKechnie J at [263]. 
76 See eg Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 114(1)(d) (admission of hearsay evidence in the interests of justice); 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 89 (the making of a witness anonymity order). 
77 See eg R v R [2015] EWCA Crim 1941 on prosecutorial disclosure of evidence. 
78 This was not always so: see generally AAS Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989). 
79 This list—adopted from AL-T Choo, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings (OUP, 
Oxford, 2nd edn, 2008), p 132—was considered by the Privy Council to provide ‘a useful summary of some of 
the [relevant] factors’: Warren v Attorney-General for Jersey [2011] UKPC 10 at [25]. 
80 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. See generally J Goudkamp, ‘The End of an Era? Illegality in Private Law in 
the Supreme Court’ (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 14. 
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impact and (c) to consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, 
bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts. Within that framework, various 
factors may be relevant, but it would be a mistake to suggest that the court is free to decide a case in an 
undisciplined way.81 
 
Potentially relevant factors include the seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether 
it was intentional and whether there was marked disparity in the parties’ respective culpability.82 
 
 A charitable explanation for the judicial under-engagement in England and Wales with 
theoretical issues raised by improperly obtained evidence is that the rebirth and growth of the 
abuse of process doctrine83 has reduced significantly the need to consider exclusion as a 
discrete measure. If the impugned evidence is minor, its exclusion would, in any event, be 
unlikely to have an impact on the ability of the prosecution to continue. If, on the other hand, 
it is a crucial piece of evidence, then the prosecution as a whole can be regarded as ‘tainted’ 
and consideration given to whether the trial should be halted as an abuse of process.84 
 The relevance of the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged is 
much debated. The UEL and New Zealand Act list, respectively, ‘the nature of the relevant 
offence’85 and ‘the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged’86 as relevant 
(and indeed, in the former case, compulsory) factors. While there are dissenting voices,87 the 
consensus in relation to the UEL appears to be that offence seriousness weighs in favour of 
admission.88 In New Zealand, too, it has been accepted that ‘the more serious the offence the 
stronger the case for admission’,89 although ‘courts should not allow the state’s legitimate ends 
to excuse grave breaches of important rights, merely because an offence is serious’.90 Likewise, 
there are indications of the view that offence seriousness weighs in favour of admission being 
                                                          
81 [2016] UKSC 42 at [120]. 
82 Ibid at [107]. 
83 See generally P Hungerford-Welch, ‘Abuse of Process: Does It Really Protect the Suspect’s Rights?’ [2017] 
Criminal Law Review 3; A Whitfort, ‘Stays of Prosecution and Remedial Integrity’ in Hunter et al (eds), above n 
46. 
84 Cf J Hunter, ‘“Tainted” Proceedings: Censuring Police Illegalities’ (1985) 59 Australian Law Journal 709. 
85 Section 138(3)(c). 
86 Section 30(3)(d). 
87 R v Dalley [2002] NSWCCA 284 at [97] per Simpson J. 
88 See discussion in Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (ALRC, Sydney, 
2005), para 16.95. 
89 Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312 at [32]. 
90 Ibid at [36]. 
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taken in England and Wales91 and in the European Court of Human Rights.92 By contrast, the 
Supreme Court of Canada considers that, 
 
 while the seriousness of the alleged offence may be a valid consideration, it has the potential to cut both 
ways. … [W]hile the public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the 
offence charged is serious, it also has a vital interest in having a justice system that is above reproach, 
particularly where the penal stakes for the accused are high.93 
 
 The view that the seriousness of the alleged offence is not a relevant factor appears also 
to have found favour with the International Criminal Court94 in interpreting article 69(7)(b) of 
the Rome Statute, which requires the exclusion of any evidence the admission of which ‘would 
be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings’.95 The ICC 
considers, further, that the probative value of the evidence should be an irrelevant consideration 
under article 69(7)(b), probative value being a matter that is more appropriately considered in 
the context of the specific provisions made in relation to it elsewhere in the Statute.96 A logical 
corollary of acknowledging this might be that any other consideration related to the potential 
contribution of the evidence to truth discovery—such as, in the UEL scheme, ‘the importance 
of the evidence in the proceeding’ (factor (b))—should also be deemed irrelevant. Notably, at 
common law, Bunning v Cross seeks to warn against giving the cogency of the evidence undue 
prominence: 
 
To treat cogency of evidence as a factor favouring admission, where the illegality in obtaining it has been 
either deliberate or reckless, may serve to foster the quite erroneous view that if such evidence be but 
damning enough that will of itself suffice to atone for the illegality involved in procuring it. For this 
                                                          
91 See eg R v Veneroso [2002] Crim LR 306 (illegal search constituting clear breach of article 8; evidence of the 
finding of drugs excluded under s 78(1), but held that result might have been different if, for example, Semtex 
had been found). 
92 Jalloh v Germany, App no 54810/00 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 11 July 2006) at [107]: ‘the public interest in 
securing the applicant’s conviction cannot be considered to have been of such weight as to warrant allowing th[e] 
evidence to be used at the trial. … [T]he measure targeted a street dealer selling drugs on a relatively small scale 
who was finally given a six months’ suspended prison sentence and probation’. 
93 R v Grant 2009 SCC 32 at [84]. 
94 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the admission of material from the ‘bar table’) ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial 
Chamber I (24 June 2009) at [44]. 
95 See generally K De Meester, The Investigation Phase in International Criminal Procedure: In Search of 
Common Rules (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2015), pp 493–506; W Jasiński, ‘Admissibility of Illegally Obtained 
Evidence in Proceedings before International Criminal Courts’ in B Krzan (ed), Prosecuting International Crimes: 
A Multidisciplinary Approach (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2016); P Viebig, Illicitly Obtained Evidence at the 
International Criminal Court (Asser Press/Springer, The Hague, 2016). 
96 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the admission of material from the ‘bar table’) ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial 
Chamber I (24 June 2009) at [43]. 
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reason cogency should, generally, be allowed to play no part in the exercise of discretion where the 
illegality involved in procuring it is intentional or reckless.97 
 
Indeed, it may be argued that the only relevant factors for consideration should be those focused 
on the impropriety itself and its seriousness.98 In the context of the UEL, these are factors (d) 
(‘the gravity of the impropriety or contravention’), (e) (‘whether the impropriety or 
contravention was deliberate or reckless’) and (f) (‘whether the impropriety or contravention 
was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’), the last of which is potentially wide, allowing, for 
example, for consideration of the right to privacy guaranteed by article 17 of the ICCPR. 
Consideration of the essential elements of factor (h)—‘the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the 
evidence without impropriety or contravention of an Australian law’—may conveniently be 
subsumed into a consideration of factors (d) and (e). It is arguable that factor (g)—‘whether 
any other proceeding (whether or not in a court) has been or is likely to be taken in relation to 
the impropriety or contravention’—should have no place in the scheme; what is important is 
how the court views the impropriety and not how it might be viewed for other purposes. 
Notably, in New Zealand, while a factor that may be considered is ‘whether there are alternative 
remedies to exclusion of the evidence that can adequately provide redress to the defendant’,99 
the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that ‘such remedies are of limited relevance in 
criminal cases in which the prosecution relies on evidence obtained in breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act’.100 
 Restricting the factors available for consideration in the manner suggested would fit 
well with the court-centred integrity rationale for exclusion, as well as assist in countering both 
principled objections to the effect that section 138(3) demands the balancing of 
incommensurables,101 and practical objections to the effect that section 138(3) generates too 
much uncertainty and unpredictability. 
 
8. Appellate Review 
Appellate courts are prepared to accord trial courts considerable leeway in applying section 
138: 
                                                          
97 (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 79. 
98 Cf Pitcher, above n 49. 
99 Evidence Act 2006 s 30(3)(f). 
100 Marwood v Commissioner of Police [2016] NZSC 139 at [27]. 
101 Cf FJ Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 575. 
21 
 
 
Because the assessment called for a value judgment in respect of which there is room for reasonable 
differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right, [what is involved is] the exercise of a 
judicial discretion with which we are not entitled to interfere unless persuaded that it was an opinion that 
was not reasonably open. This is not an appeal where the court may ‘decide for itself’ whether the 
desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs its undesirability.102 
 
This approach is consistent with that of other jurisdictions such as Canada: ‘Where the trial 
judge has considered the proper factors, appellate courts should accord considerable deference 
to his or her ultimate determination’.103 There is a tendency, on the part of the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales104 and the European Court of Human Rights,105 to emphasise the 
reliability of the impugned evidence as a justification for not interfering with a decision to 
admit it, thereby giving the impression of according crime control considerations undue 
prominence. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Understandably, what impact illegality or impropriety should have on proceedings is never a 
straightforward question for the law to resolve; respectively, the landmark 2015 and 2016 
decisions of the Irish Supreme Court and United Kingdom Supreme Court on 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence and illegality in contract produced 4:3 and 3:2 splits in 
reasoning. It is axiomatic that a clearer picture of what is happening ‘on the ground’ in any 
jurisdiction with the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is impossible to gain in the 
absence of evidence from a large-scale empirical study. My impressionistic view, though, is 
that section 138 of the UEL might not, in practice, operate all that differently from the relevant 
law pertaining to improperly obtained evidence in England and Wales, which is characterised 
by far fewer articulations of applicable principles. I have suggested above that superimposed 
on a discretionary system should be rules of law rendering particular categories of improperly 
obtained evidence automatically inadmissible. It was explained, by reference to the position in 
England and Wales, why this is not as radical a suggestion as it may seem. In all cases, the 
                                                          
102 DPP v Marijancevic [2011] VSCA 355 at [90], applying House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499. 
103 R v Grant 2009 SCC 32 at [86]. 
104 R v Sanghera [2001] 1 Cr App R 20 (p 299) at [15] (‘the appellant did not challenge the fact of the discovery 
of the money. … There was no issue as to the reliability of the evidence’); R v Mason [2002] EWCA Crim 385 at 
[77] (‘The appellants were not tricked into saying what they did even though they were placed in a position where 
they were likely to do so’). 
105 Khan v UK, App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000) at [37]: ‘the tape recording was acknowledged to be 
very strong evidence, and … there was no risk of it being unreliable’. 
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New Zealand approach of not requiring the defence to prove an allegation of impropriety, but 
merely to raise it, should be adopted. Outside the categories of automatic inadmissibility, the 
prosecution should be required to justify the admission of improperly obtained evidence by 
reference to a far narrower range of factors than appears in section 138(3). Finally, it might be 
appropriate to allow appellate courts greater scope to intervene in overturning the decisions of 
trial courts.106 
 The pressure apparently felt by appellate courts not to be perceived to be too ready to 
sanction the exclusion of probative and apparently reliable, but improperly obtained, evidence 
will clearly not dissipate over time. Indeed, any such pressure may well intensify. The recent 
retreat by the Irish Supreme Court from its previously stronger exclusionary stance is telling. 
It is to be hoped that the proposals made above will be viewed as charting a logical and coherent 
path forward for the development of the law not only in the UEL jurisdictions, but also in such 
jurisdictions as those whose experiences have informed the discussions in this chapter. Where 
dictated by an application of the criteria identified above, judicial ‘readiness’ to sanction 
exclusion will be entirely justified. 
                                                          
106 Redmayne makes a similar argument in relation to the bad character evidence provisions of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 of England and Wales: M Redmayne, Character in the Criminal Trial (OUP, Oxford, 2015), p 172 n 
148. 
